Evidence - Presumptions - Statutory Presumption of Due Care in Wrongful Death Action by Beytagh, Francis X., Jr.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 60 Issue 4 
1962 
Evidence - Presumptions - Statutory Presumption of Due Care in 
Wrongful Death Action 
Francis X. Beytagh Jr. 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Francis X. Beytagh Jr., Evidence - Presumptions - Statutory Presumption of Due Care in Wrongful Death 
Action, 60 MICH. L. REV. 510 (1962). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol60/iss4/8 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
510 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
EVIDENCE - PRESUMPTIONS - STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF DUE CARE IN 
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION - Consolidation of two actions arising from 
a multi-vehicle highway accident resulted in verdicts in both causes against 
appellants. One action was brought against appellants by the adminis-
tratrix of a deceased driver under a wrongful death statute, and resulted 
in a verdict for the administratrix because of a statutory presumption of 
deceased's due care.1 The other action was a personal injury suit by a 
third party against appellants and the administratrix as co-defendants, and 
resulted in a verdict exonerating the deceased driver, despite circumstances 
raising an inference of his negligence. Appellants' motions for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and new trial were denied. On appeal, held, 
reversed and remanded for separate trials of the previously consolidated 
actions. In light of statutory provisions requiring jury instructions on a 
presumption of decedent's due care in wrongful death actions, and factual 
circumstances indicating prima fade negligence on the part of the decedent, 
consolidation of these actions was improper and created a situation of 
conflicting presumptions in which the giving of meaningful jury instruc-
tions was a practical impossibility. Lambach v. Northwestern Refining 
Co., lll N.W.2d 345 (Minn. 1961). 
Few areas of law have been as productive of confusion and discord as 
the subject of presumptions.2 Embodying elements of both substantive and 
procedural law, and caught in a conflict between modern doctrinal develop-
ment and judicial inertia, presumptions have been defined, classified, 
explained and criticized in numerous court opinions and in volumes of 
legal commentary.3 Celebrated disputes have raged as to the nature and 
function of presumptions. A basic conflict concerns the determination of 
their precise procedural effect. Closely related to this are varying theories 
1 MINN. STAT. § 602.04 (1957) , which provides: "In any action to recover damages 
for negligently causing the death of a person, it shall be presumed that any person 
whose death resulted from the occurrence giving rise to the action was, at the time of 
the commission of the alleged negligent act or acts, in the exercise of due care for his 
own safety. The jury shall be instructed of the existence of such presumption, and shall 
determine whether the presumption is rebutted by the evidence in the action." 
2 "Every writer of sufficient intelligence to appreciate the difficulties of the subject-
matter has approached the topic of presumptions with a sense of hopelessness and left 
it with a feeling of despair." Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REv. 255 (1937). 
3 See, e.g., McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 635-686 (1954) ; THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE 
ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 313-352 (1898); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2483-2550 
(3d ed. 1940) ; Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden 
of Proof, 68 U. PA. L. REv. 307 (1920); Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 
5 VAND. L. REv. 324 (1952); Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 
52 MICH. L. REv. 195 (1953) ; McCormick, Charges on Presumptions and Burden of 
Proof, 5 N.C.L. REv. 291 (1927); Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 
44 HARv. L. REv. 906 (1931); Morgan, Techniques in the Use of Presumptions, 24 IOWA 
L. REv. 413 (1939); Reaugh, Presumptions and the Burden of Proof (pts. 1-2), 36 ILL. 
L. REv. 703, 819 (1942) • The tremendous amount of pertinent legal literature necessitates 
selective and representative, not exhaustive, reference thereto. 
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as to the quantity and quality of evidence required to rebut a presump• 
tion. Jurists and scholars alike differ regarding the propriety of giving 
jury instructions on presumptions. Assiduous efforts at classification have 
been made, with careful articulation of the bases on which various pre-
sumptions rest. Contributing to the overall confusion is the anomalous 
presumption of due care in negligence cases. 
A presumption, generally defined, is a rule of law involving the assump-
tion of a certain factual situation, at least temporarily, upon proof of other, 
usually logically related, facts, developed for reasons of convenience, policy, 
probability or necessity.4 By the weight of authority, genuine presump-
tions are not evidence, or substitutes for evidence, but are merely pro-
cedural devices, shifting the burden of proceeding, or, more accurately, 
the risk of not proceeding, on a particular issue to the party against whom 
they operate. They are rebuttable and not conclusive, but are more than 
mere permissible inferences. Although there is nothing sacrosanct about 
the term "presumption," and theoretically many species could exist, only 
those devices which operate as burden-shifters are properly labelled pre-
sumptions.IS Inaccurate use of the term to include other concepts results in 
confusing and incongruous attempts to apply presumption doctrines in 
inappropriate situations. Since presumptions are functionally burden-
shifters, a presumption which purports to operate against the party having 
both the burden of persuasion and the burden of going forward with the 
evidence is anomalous and redundant, restating the already existing burden 
of proof on a given issue. Specifically, a so-called presumption of decedent's 
due care for his own safety in wrongful death actions is a phantom and 
non-genuine presumption in those jurisdictions (a significant majority) 
where the burden of proof of the decedent's contributory negligence is 
already on the defendant. Continued reference to a "presumption of due 
care" concept in this context is unwarranted and unwise. 
The presumption of due care in wrongful death cases6 probably 
originated in jurisdictions where the burden of proving due care, or freedom 
from contributory negligence, was allocated to the plaintiff.7 In such 
4 This definition is a simplified composite of those stated in various sources. 
IS Sec Falknor, Notes on Presumptions, 15 WASH. L. REv. 71, 74-75 (1940). Certain 
"special" kinds of presumptions, of which the so-called presumption of innocence in 
criminal cases is a prime example, have long been recognized, and generally perceived 
to be such. See McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 647-649 (1954); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF 
EVIDENCE 40 (1954) • 
6 Two distinct considerations arc typically postulated as the basis of such a pre-
sumption: the natural instinct of self-preservation and inherent love of life common 
to all humanity, and the avoidance of any unfairness which might otherwise result 
because of the decedent's inability to testify regarding his actions. 
7 See Falknor, supra note 5, at 76; 41 CALIF. L. REv. 748, 749-750 (1953) • Loose 
language in early opinions regarding presumptions makes a categorical statement of 
this conjecture impossible. 
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jurisdictions, when there is no direct evidence concerning the fatal incident, 
use of a presumption to shift the burden of going forward with evidence of 
contributory negligence to the defendant is eminently sensible.8 But hazy 
logic abounds in the application of such a presumption in jurisdictions 
where the burden of proof of contributory negligence is already on the 
defendant. A few legal writers and scholars have perceived the anomaly 
of such a presumptive concept, and exposed judicial use of inappropriate 
terminology and the confusing characterization of such devices as genuine 
presumptions.9 Nor has this anomaly completely escaped the attention 
of all courts.10 A few tribunals appreciative of the problems presented by 
such a presumption have nevertheless, for policy reasons, upheld its func-
tion as conferring an inferential benefit or as imposing a separate and 
added burden of rebuttal.11 The vast majority of courts, however, fail to 
s See Mast v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 79 F. Supp. 149 (N.D. Iowa 1948), for an example 
of the operation of the presumption of due care in such a jurisdiction. See also, Note, 38 
IowA L. REv. 155 (1952), regarding this so-called "no-eyewitness" rule in Iowa. 
9 Especially illuminating is Falknor, supra note 5, at 76. Reflection of Falknor's 
attitude is indicated by the decision in Hutton v. Martin, 41 Wash. 2d 780, 252 P.2d 581 
(1953) , discussed in Faler, Presumption of Due Care by Decedent: An Anomaly Destroyed, 
29 WASH. L. REv. 79 (1954). Morgan recognized the anomaly, but did little more than 
pose it as a question. See MORGAN, PRESUMPTIONS: THEIR NATURE, PURPOSE AND REASON 
15 (1949); Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HARV. L. REv. 481, 503 (1946); 
Morgan, supra note 2, at 271. See also LADD, CASES ON EVIDENCE 831-832 (2d ed. 1959); 
Falknor, Evidence, 1952 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 723; Comment, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 57, 
61 (1961); 14 B.U.L. REv. 440 (1934); 41 CALIF. L. REv. 748 (1953) • For an interesting 
though not too perceptive running discussion of the presumption of due care in Penn• 
sylvania, see 20 PA. B.A.Q. 24 (1948); 30 PA. B.A.Q. 208 (1959); 31 PA. B.A.Q. 21 
(1959). 
10 Such a presumptive concept has aptly been characterized as "like a handkerchief 
thrown over something covered by a blanket," and wholly overshadowed by the burden 
of proof so as to be without practical effect. Brown v. Henderson, 285 Mass. 192, 196-
97, 189 N.E. 41, 43-44 (1934) (concurring opinion). It has been labelled as superfluous 
and non-genuine, with only theoretical or verbal existence, Brown v. Henderson, supra, 
and as "a double and unjust use of one and the same thing," Lisbon v. Lyman, 49 N.H. 
553, 563 (1870). See also People v. Miller, 288 N.Y. 31, 33, 41 N.E.2d 445, 446 (1942). 
It has been judicially asserted that this concept serves only to complicate the charge 
and confuse the jury. Perry v. Boston Elevated Ry., 322 Mass. 206, 210, 76 N.E.2d 653, 
656 (1948) • Imposing an additional or enlarged burden on a defendant to rebut such 
a presumption, while also requiring establishment of contributory negligence by a 
preponderance of the evidence, has likewise been severely criticized. See City of Indianap-
olis v. Keeley, 167 Ind. 516, 79 N.E. 499 (1906); Ross v. Pendergast, 353 Mo. 300, 182 
S.W.2d 307 (1944) ; Susser v. Wiley, 350 Pa. 427, 39 A.2d 616 (1944) ; Scott v. Burke, 
39 Cal. 2d 388, 402, 247 P.2d 313, 321 (1952) (dissenting opinion). It has been charac-
terized as a mere reiteration of the burden of proof, Board of Water Comm'rs v. Robbins, 
82 Conn. 623, 640, 74 At!. 938, 945 (1910) ; as a locative, inactive device, a "dry" pre-
sumption, Sheldon v. Wright, 80 Vt. 298, 320, 67 Atl. 807, 815 (1907); "meaningless," 
Speck v. Sarver, 20 Cal. 2d 585, 593, 128 P .2d 16, 20 (1942) (dissenting opinion) , with 
only fictitious or technical existence, and a vice without utility. As aptly stated, " .•• 
unguarded and inexact expression about presumptions should here be scrupulously 
avoided." Sheldon v. Wright, supra at 319, 67 Atl. at 815. 
11 See Worth v. Worth, 48 Wyo. 441, 49 P.2d 649 (1935); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Home, 65 N.M. 440, 338 P.2d 1067 (1959). 
1962] RECENT DECISIONS 513 
perceive the anomaly of such a presumption. Without making a careful 
distinction between it and operative, burden-shifting presumptions, these 
courts unquestioningly endeavor to apply the same rules as to effect, re-
buttal, and instructions to both true and non-genuine, or dry, presump-
tions. Justifications for the continued existence of the so-called "presump-
tion of due care" in negligence cases, in a jurisdiction such as Minnesota, 
are all signally ineffective in demonstrating any plausibility in characteriz-
ing and handling it as a true presumption.12 
Although in Minnesota the burden of proof on the issue of contributory 
negligence has always been upon the defendant, a so-called "presumption 
of due care" in wrongful death cases is deeply ingrained in Minnesota 
jurisprudence. Little perception of any distinction between burden-shift-
ing and dry presumptions appears in early Minnesota judicial history, 
with the presumption of due care concept regarded mainly as a restate-
ment of and correlative to the burden of proof.13 As a body of law 
12 In summary, these suggested justifications, and their lack of substantiality, are 
as follows: 
I. As a permissible inference from ordinary experience, based on a universal human 
fastinct of self-preservation; analogous is the concept that instructions on such a so-
called presumption are permissible forms of judicial comment on evidence, as a caution-
ary device for juries. See Levin, Pennsylvania and the Uniform Rules of Evidence: 
Presumptions and Dead Man Statutes, 103 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 1, 27-28 (1954); Note, 32 
NEB. L. REv. 613, 616 (1953); 26 NoTRE DAME LAw. 547, 549 (1951) . The logic of 
such an inference appears dubious, as careful men are sometimes careless, and it seems 
that persons surviving an accident had at least as much of an instinct of self-preservation 
as those killed. Regardless, such a concept should not be labelled a presumption, but 
accepted and utilized, if deemed valid and necessary, for what it is, without confusing 
juries and litigants by referring to it as a presumption. 
2. As evidence. See McBaine, Presumptions; Are They Evidence?, 26 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 
519 (1938); Weinstock and Chase, The "Presumption of Due Care" in California, 4 
HAmNGS L.J. 124 (1953); Comment, 2 STAN. L. R.Ev. 559 (1950); 51 MICH. L. R.Ev. 295 
(1952), concerning particularly the situation in California, where presumptions are 
regarded as evidence. The probability on which such an evidentiary conception is 
based is somewhat doubtful, and the majority of jurisdictions have rejected the idea 
of presumptions as evidence, refusing to give any artificial probative force thereto. 
3. As a principle of substantive law requiring more proof than a preponderance of 
the evidence on the contributory negligence issue in wrongful death cases. See Holt, 
Presumptions in Utah: A Search for Certainty, 5 UTAH L. R.Ev. 196, 214-15 (1956). 
Strong policy considerations of solicitude for bereaved survivors of a decedent, circum-
vention of the total recovery bar of contributory negligence, and avoidance of any 
unfairness because of decedent's absence from trial are operative. Yet, most juris-
dictions have definitively stated that no enlarged burden is being placed on the defendant 
when the presumption is invoked. Admitting the propriety of doing so, nevertheless 
a forthright statement of such an increased burden, rather than recourse to the con-
fusion and inappropriateness of presumption terminology, is advisable. 
4. As another way of stating where the burden of proof (in both senses) rests. 
See Laughlin, supra note 3, at 199; Roberts, An Introduction to the Study of Pre-
sumptions, 4 VILL. L. R.Ev. 475, 487 (1959) ; 37 MINN. L. R.Ev. 629, 631 (1953) . If this 
is its justification, then such a presumption is redundant and unnecessary, merely a 
source of confusion and basis for reversal, a crude and superfluous jury control device. 
13 See, e.g., Searfoss v. Chicago, M. 8: St. P.R.R., 106 Minn. 490, 119 N.W. 66 
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developed from repeated recital of presumptive language,14 an evidentiary 
conception of this so-called presumption was generally adopted,15 although 
hints of recognition of the anomaly of this device appeared.16 In 1939 
Minnesota adopted the Thayer-Wigmore theory of presumptions in Ryan 
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,11 the Supreme Court definitively holding 
that presumptions are not evidence or substitutes for evidence, but are 
merely procedural devices to shift the burden of going forward with the 
evidence, and that jury instructions regarding presumptions are generally 
improper. In relation to the so-called "presumption of due care," this 
doctrine received varying interpretation and applifation18 until, in TePoel 
v. Larson,19 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that it was reversible error 
to instruct the jury that there is such a presumption.20 Although falling 
(1909) ; Hendrickson v. Great No. Ry., 49 Minn. 245, 51 N.W. 1044 (1892). The term 
"presumption" was certainly not being used as a precise and technical word of legal 
art in the early Minnesota decisions. 
14 The due care device was characterized as "a very strong presumption." Gilbert 
v. City of Tracy, 115 Minn. 443, 444, 132 N.W. 752 (1911) . Jury instruction regard-
ing its application was held proper. See Carson v. Turrish, 140 Minn. 445, 168 N.W. 
349 (1918) . The due care presumption was never regarded as applicable to any but 
death actions in Minnesota, although other jurisdictions sometimes recognized such 
a concept when direct evidence concerning the incident was for some reason lacking. 
In Minnesota, the due care presumption was consistently held not to enlarge or in-
crease defendant's burden of proof on the contributory negligence issue. E.g., Aubin 
v. Duluth St. Ry., 169 Minn. 342, 348, 211 N.W. 580, 583 (1926). 
15 See, e.g., Oxborough v. Murphy Transfer & Storage Co., 194 Minn. 335, 259 
N.W. 305 (1935); Jasinuk v. Lombard, 189 Minn. 594, 250 N.W. 568 (1933). 
16 See Gross v. General Inv. Co., 194 Minn. 23, 30, 259 N.W. 557, 560 (1935); 
Peterson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 206 Minn. 268, 274, 288 N.W. 588, 590-91 
(1939) , stating that "it is perhaps difficult to understand precisely how this presumption 
operates"; Ralston v. Tomlinson, 207 Minn. 485, 488, 292 N.W. 24, 26 (1940) , perceiv-
ing that it was not in "the nature of a true presumption." 
17 206 Minn. 562, 289 N.W. 557 (1939), 24 MINN. L. REv. 651 (1940), a case not 
involving the so-called "presumption of due care.'' 
18 See Moeller v. St. Paul City Ry., 218 Minn. 353, 16 N.W.2d 289 (1944); 
Birnberg v. Northern Pac. Ry., 217 Minn. 187, 14 N.W.2d 410 (1944); Duff v. Bemidji 
Motor Serv. Co., 210 Minn. 456, 299 N.W. 196 (1941); Lang v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 
208 Minn. 487, 295 N.W. 57 (1940). 
19 236 Minn. 482, 53 N.W .2d 468 (1952) , 37 MINN. L. REv. 629 (1953) , followed 
by Knuth v. Murphy, 237 Minn. 225, 54 N.W .2d 771 (1952) . See DeParcq, The Uniform 
Rules of Evidence: A Plaintiff's View, 40 MINN. L. REv. 301, 309-13 (1956) ; Gauscwitz, 
Presumptions, 40 MINN. L. REv. 391, 401-02 (1956). 
20 "[T]he burden rests on defendant to prove contributory negligence on the part 
of the decedent by a fair preponderance of the evidence. If defendant sustains the 
required burden of proof, he should prevail irrespective of any presumption. If he 
fails to do so or the evidence is in equilibrium, he should lose on this issue irrespective 
of any presumption. Under these circumstances, the aid of the presumption is not 
necessary . . . . Where, as here, the burden of proving a fact already rests on the party 
against whom the presumption operates, instructing the jury that there is such a 
presumption of due care could be justified only on the theory that the presumption 
is evidence, a view • . • which we have rejected • • • , or on the theory that more 
than a preponderance of the evidence is required to overcome the presumption • • • • 
We now hold that, where the burden of proving contributory negligence rests on 
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short of completely discarding the concept, the court, consistent with the 
view adopted in the Ryan case, did recognize the anomaly of a presump-
tion purporting to operate against the party having the burden of proof. 
The TePoel decision was a step toward total abolition of any remnants 
of the confusing due care presumption. Further development in this 
regard, however, was thwarted by the Minnesota legislature's enactment 
in 1957 of a statute21 stating the existence of such a presumption in 
wrongful death cases, and requiring jury instruction thereon and jury de-
termination as to its rebuttal. Perhaps the intent of the legislature was 
to restore the evidentiary conception of the presumption of due care as it 
existed prior to the Ryan and TePoel cases.22 Framing such an intent in 
the form of a statutory presumption requiring jury instruction created an 
intolerable situation for a court which only so recently had arrived at a 
perceptive comprehension of the anomaly of such a concept in relation to 
the nature and function of true presumptions. Such legislative short-
sightedness demands a strong judicial elucidation of the undesirability of 
embodying such a concept in the form of a presumption.ll3 
the party against whom a presumption of due care operates, it is error to instruct the 
jury that there is such a presumption." TePoel v. Larson, supra note 19, at 491, 493, 
53 N.W.2d at 473. It is significant and interesting that the court cited Falknor's lead-
ing article, Notes on Presumptions, supra note 5, in its opinion. 
21 MINN. STAT. § 602.04 (1957) • 
22 This view has been suggested. Roeck v. Halvorson, 254 Minn. 394, 399, 95 N.W.2d 
172, 176 (1959), 44 MINN. L. REv. 352, 356, where refusal to instruct the jury because 
of a court determination that the statutory presumption had been rebutted as a matter 
of law was upheld, and wherein its constitutionality was discussed. Referring to 
"strong policy considerations" involved, this law review note alludes to the additional 
burden therewith placed upon the defendant, applauding the statute as obviating a 
mechanistic approach to the presumption "demanded by the 'Wigmore-Thayer' doc-
trine," for reasons of logic and fairness. 44 MINN. L. REv. at 357. Such an analysis 
fails to appreciate that the same policy considerations could be implemented and 
effectuated without resulting in ambignity and confusion through use of presumption 
terminology. 
23 Indications of judicial objection to this statutory presumption are not lacking 
in the instant opinion. Knutson, J., who wrote the court's opinion in the TePoel case, 
states in concurring that ". • • the burden already rests on defendant to prove contribu-
tory negligence • • • by a fair preponderance of the evidence.'' Principal case at 351. 
Dut the main thrust of his statements is directed against the consolidation of these 
actions, as stated, "As long as § 602.04 remains as part of our statutory law, cases in 
which a trustee of a decedent sues to recover for his death should not be consolidated 
with cases in which the representative of the estate of the same decedent is sued as a 
defendant.'' Principal case at 351-52. The concurring opinion of Dell, Ch. J., places 
sole blame for the confused situation on "the consolidation of cases which should not 
have been tried together," not "because of the instruction relating to the presumption 
of due care as provided by Minn. St. 602.04.'' Principal case at 352. Some understanding 
is evinced, though, as stated, "While from a practical standpoint it is entirely proper 
to instruct a jury as to the presumption of due care except in those cases where the 
presumption has been rebutted as a matter of law, from a theoretical standpoint it 
may be wrong to do so.'' Principal case at 353. Lack of discrimination between true 
and dry presumptions characterizes this second concurring opinion, however, with its 
extended discussion of the rebuttal of this "presumption.'' 
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Admittedly, the Minnesota court is here faced, as always, with making 
a decision in a particular case situation. Seemingly little is accomplished 
by requiring new separate trials, since the perceived presumptive conflict 
will still be presented for resolution. Arguably, it would be more palatable 
to hold the decedent negligent and also not negligent in separate trials 
rather than in a consolidated action.24 Although recognizing the impos-
sibility of intelligible jury instructions because of this statutory presump-
tion,25 the court's attack on consolidation and its reference to the question 
of conflicting presumptions are peripheral and somewhat misplaced. The 
problem presented does not result primarily from the consolidation of 
actions, nor is it really one of conflicting or inconsistent presumptions.26 
Rather, it is essentially a problem arising from legislative interference in 
a field of judicial cognizance, by the creation of an anomalous statutory 
presumption that cannot function as a true presumption. At the heart of 
the difficulty, in all probability, is the accepted doctrine that contributory 
negligence provides a complete and total defense to recovery in negligence-
based actions. The effect of this much-assailed principle is especially 
acute in wrongful death cases. The statutorily-revived presumption of due 
care approximates a somewhat inarticulate legislative method of avoiding 
some of the harshness of the contributory negligence doctrine, and of 
assisting in recoveries by decedent's estates in death actions. It is trite to 
comment that two wrongs do not make a right. The area of presumptions 
is already too confused to confuse it further by calling something a pre-
sumption which is the embodiment of an inherent redundancy, and can 
never operate as such. If the contributory negligence doctrine barring any 
recovery is so objectionable, recourse to some type of comparative negli-
gence concept, at least in this limited context, might be feasible. Alterna-
tively, a frank legislative dictate requiring a greater burden of proof on 
the contributory negligence issue in wrongful death actions would also be 
24 Serious practical difficulties arising from res judicata doctrines, especially col-
lateral estoppel concepts in some jurisdictions, as alluded to by the court in its opinion, 
may result from separate trial of actions in these circumstances, and make recovery 
somewhat dependent on which trial happens to reach judgment first. See Comment, 
65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 861-65 (1952). 
25 This difficulty will probably still be presented in the separate trial of the wrong-
ful death action. 
26 The bases of this assertion are that the so-called presumption of due care is 
an inactive and dry (though now statutory) presumption in a jurisdiction such as 
Minnesota, and that the inference of negligence from driving on the wrong side of a 
road is not a crystallized legal presumption. Divergent theories regarding the prob-
lem of conflicting or inconsistent presumptions, when such is actually presented 
(that such a situation is logically impossible, that they should cancel out each other, 
that the stronger should prevail, etc.) , usually have resulted from varying views 
as to the nature and function of presumptions. See generally McBaine, Burden of Proof: 
Presumptions, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 13, 28 (1954); Morgan, How To Approach Burden 
of Proof and Presumptions, 25 RocKY MT. L. REv. 34, 47 (1952) ; other general references 
previously cited regarding presumptions. 
1962] RECENT DECISIONS 517 
acceptable. Had the court reiterated its perception of the anomaly of 
the so-called "presumption of due care" in unequivocal terms, and impor-
tuned legislative restatement of policy in some form other than by use of 
presumption terminology, any actual decision in the instant case would 
be satisfactory. 
Rules of evidence are ostensibly established to ascertain the probabili-
ties of actuality in a past factual situation, and by so ascertaining, to enable 
the judicial machinery to render justice to litigants. Progress in the de-
velopment of rules of evidence will be signalled by a reduction in the 
number of cases in which such procedural disputes are presented. Inac-
curate terminology and laxity in discrimination only add confusion to the 
already unsettled area of presumptions. An anomalous statutory presump-
tion such as that contained in the Minnesota statute creates and complicates 
judicial problems, and, without disregarding the validity of the intent and 
sentiment so inaptly expressed, unquestionably should be repealed and 
abolished. 
Francis X. Beytagh, Jr. 
